Brief Discussion on Origin and Development of Self-nature -Centered on the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Abstract
paper seeks to compare the self-nature of the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna. There is no arising and ceasing of
self-nature in the Sarvāstivāda, but only the function of arising and ceasing. In contrast, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā assumes that a description
of self-nature should have a concept, and the concept as a name should be extinguished. One of the arguments of the Sarvāstivāda for the
actual existence of self-nature is that there is perception (*buddhi). The attachment to conceptualization in Nāgārjuna’s doctrine is not
limited to language or thought but covers all directed cognitive activities. My hypothesis is that there is a diff erence in scope between the
self-nature rejected by Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Sarvāstivāda’s self-nature that is neither arising nor ceasing; moreover, from the
epistemological point of view, the self-nature rejected by Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is the self-nature that is perceived by the Sarvāstivāda.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18686/modern-management-forum.v7i8.9954
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