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Matching Outcomes in SOM vs. Boston Mechanism

Ziyin Li

Abstract


We critically examine the Sequential Offer Mechanism (SOM) in the context of school choice, comparing it to the Boston Mechanism. Our focus is on the properties of stability within SOM. When students report their true preferences, under the condition that every
school fills its capacity, the matching outcome of the Sequential Offer Mechanism (SOM) is identical to that of the Boston Mechanism.

Keywords


School Choice; Sequential Offer Mechanism (SOM)

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18686/fm.v9i1.12030

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