Repeated Game Analysis of Trade Friction between China and India
Abstract
As two emerging economies with similar development stages, China and India have broad prospects for cooperation. However, with the deepening of trade cooperation between the two countries, India has initiated more and more trade relief measures against China. Trade friction between the two countries has increased, which has caused great losses to China's export trade. Based on the repeated game model theory, this research founds that the trade friction between China and India is not conducive to the long-term interests of both sides, and the best choice for both sides is to adopt cooperative strategies.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18686/fm.v7i4.6316
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